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MEDICARE: THE PERPETUAL BALANCE 
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND PRESERVATION 
Craig B. Garner* 
“Confusion is a word we have invented for an order which is not 
understood.”1  
Passed by Congress and signed by President Lyndon Johnson into law in 
1965, Medicare2 has weathered storms from all directions, growing to be the 
preeminent standard for health insurance in the United States.3  The idea of 
losing Medicare as a vital public benefit still remains the single greatest fear 
with which each passing generation of Americans must contend, and yet, 
these challenges over the past fifty years, designed to fortify Medicare’s 
foundation and ensure its longevity, continue to take a toll on the program.4 
The most recent climate of reform includes changes implemented by the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).5  The PPACA is 
designed to expand coverage for a broader group of people, yet it adds 
unprecedented layers of complexity such that it may be but a matter of time 
before the confusion experienced by today’s providers proves to be 	  
* Craig B. Garner is an attorney and health care consultant, specializing in issues 
surrounding modern American healthcare and the ways in which it should be managed in 
its current climate of reform. Mr. Garner’s law practice focuses on healthcare mergers 
and acquisitions, regulatory compliance, and counseling for providers in all 
matters pertaining to contemporary healthcare in the United States.  Mr. Garner is also an 
adjunct professor of law at Pepperdine University School of Law, where he teaches 
courses on Hospital Law and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
 
 1. HENRY MILLER, TROPIC OF CAPRICORN 176 (Grove Press, Inc. 1961). 
 2. Originally Title 18 of the Social Security Act. 
      3.    See, e.g., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: 
MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 30 (Mar. 2014), available at http://medpac.gov/ 
documents/Mar14_EntireReport.pdf (“Because of its size and because other payers use 
its payment methods, Medicare has an important influence on the nation’s health care 
delivery system and its evolution.”). The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(“MedPAC”) is an independent congressional agency established by the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-6). 
 4. Seniors Fear Hit to Medicare, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/01/seniors-worry-health-care-law-will-
hurt-them/. 
 5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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Medicare’s undoing altogether.  The decades of trial and error upon which 
health care in the United States have been built, at least from the point of 
view of both physicians and lawmakers who watch from the sidelines, may 
give way to confusion and disruption industry-wide as a result of newly 
enacted regulations.6 
Today, Medicare is the preeminent standard for health insurance in the 
United States, expanding despite fluctuations in the economic, political and 
social climate since its initial passage.  However, in its struggle toward 
sustainability, the Medicare Program must understand the resulting 
consequences as it distances itself further and further from its original 
simplicity in 1965.7 
Medicare’s original cost-based system gave way in the 1980s to the 
Prospective Payment System (“PPS”),8 an event noted by many with great 
concern.9  Under PPACA, the Medicare system takes another monumental 
step as it incorporates elements of performance into the PPS.10  Formulaic 
and confusing, Medicare’s recent approach to provider reimbursement has 
been likened to Finnegan’s Wake by James Joyce,11 a book that some critics 	  
 6. Compare Herrymon Mauer, The M.D.’s Are Off Their Pedestal, FORTUNE MAG. 
138, Feb. 1954, with Kevin Vachon, Confused and Disengaged About Health Care, 
PORTLAND DAILY SUN (May 15, 2013, 4:04 PM), http://www.portlanddailysun.me 
/index.php/opinion/columns/9355-confused-and-disengaged-about-health-care. 
 7. In Medicare’s early years, “unrestricted cost reimbursement became the modus 
operandi for financial American medical care.”  Rick Mayes, The Origins, Development, 
and Passage of Medicare’s Revolutionary Prospective Payment System, 62 J. HIST. MED.  
& ALLIED SCI. 21, 24 (2007).  According to Sheila Burke, Chief of Staff of Former 
Senator Robert Dole: “Medicare’s traditional model of cost reimbursement was insanity.  
On the face of it, it encouraged people to do more; it paid them to do more and not in any 
particularly rational way.”  Id. at 22 (emphasis in original).  
 8. First, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (“TEFRA”) directed the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop a proposal for legislation that would 
provide for reimbursement “on a prospective basis.”  Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 101(c), 96 
Stat. 324, 335 (1982).  The following year, Congress created the “Prospective Payment 
System” (“PPS”), which hospitals first became subject to on October 1, 1983, and was 
phased in over a period of four years.  Alvarado Cnty. Hosp. v. Shalala, 155 F.3d 1115, 
1119 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012)). 
 9. See, e.g., Ross Mullner & David McNeil, Rural and Urban Hospital Closures: A 
Comparison, 56 HEALTH AFFAIRS 131 (1986). 
 10. See, e.g., Matthew J. Press, Limits of Readmission Rates in Measuring Hospital 
Quality Suggest the Need for Added Metrics, 6 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1083 (June 2013). 
 11. See, e.g., Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp. v. Sebelius, 841 F. Supp. 2d 270, 
270, 270 n.1 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d by 718 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (comparing James 
Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake to the Medicare statute, and calling it “among the most 
completely impenetrable texts within human experience.”) (quoting Rehab. Assn’ of Va. 
v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
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warn requires “skeleton keys” to understand.12  In many ways, the need for 
hospitals and physicians to understand these performance-based measures 
may seem less important when fear of Medicare insolvency looms in the 
distance,13 especially as it relates to Medicare Part A (hospital insurance 
benefits for inpatient services) and Medicare Part B (supplemental insurance 
for outpatient services, among other things).14  Irrespective of the fleeting 
grasp providers may have over PPACA’s new Medicare system, hospitals 
and physicians alike are mindful that the PPS as they once knew it is gone, 
replaced in part with the beginnings of a performance-based Medicare in 
which they may lose precious revenue, one percentage point at a time.15 
I. MEDICARE’S MODERN DAY STRUGGLE TO SUSTAIN GUARANTEED 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
In its initial form, Part A of the Medicare Act provided coverage for 
inpatient hospital costs and other similar expenses to all persons 65 years of 
age or older who could satisfy the legal residency requirements.16  Part B, on 
the other hand, created a voluntary program for qualifying low-income 
	  
 12. See, e.g., ELOISE KNOWLTON, JOYCE, JOYCEANS, AND THE RHETORIC OF CITATION 
3 (The University Press of Florida 1998). One example from Finnegan’s Wake is the 
word “bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonnerronntuonnthunntrovarrhouna 
wnskawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!,” JAMES JOYCE, FINNEGAN’S WAKE 3 (The Viking 
Press 1939), which critics note may mark the downfall of Adam and Eve.  See Michael 
Chabon, What to Make of Finnegan’s Wake? N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 12, 2012, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jul/12/what-make-finnegans-
wake/?pagination=false. 
 13. See, e.g., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTH CARE 
SPENDING & THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 8 (June 2012),  http://www.medpac.gov/docume 
nts/Jun12DataBookEntireReport.pdf  (“Beginning in 2010, the aging of the baby-boom 
generation, an expected increase in life expectancy, and the Medicare drug benefit are 
likely to increase the proportion of economic resources devoted to Medicare.”).  
    14.    See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 698 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
 15. See, e.g., id.  
 16. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 506 (1994) 
(“Medicare is a federally funded health insurance program for the elderly and disabled.”).  
Originally Title 18 of the Social Security Act, as amended by Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 
286 (1965).  When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Medicare into law on July 30, 
1965, he credited Harry S. Truman as the one who “planted the seeds of compassion and 
duty” that resulted in Medicare.  President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of 
the Medicare Bill (July 30, 1965) [hereinafter Johnson, Remarks at Signing], available at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/anniversaries/medicarebill.htm. 
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individuals to insure against costs from physician and other specific 
outpatient services and supplies.17 
After signing this historic act into law, President Johnson commented: 
No longer will older Americans be denied the healing miracle of 
modern medicine. No longer will illness crush and destroy the 
savings that they have so carefully put away over a lifetime so that 
they might enjoy dignity in their later years. No longer will young 
families see their own incomes, and their own hopes, eaten away 
simply because they are carrying out their deep moral obligations 
to their parents, and to their uncles, and their aunts.  And no longer 
will this Nation refuse the hand of justice to those who have given 
a lifetime of service and wisdom and labor to the progress of this 
progressive country.18 
The foundational coverage provided by Medicare’s Part A includes ninety 
consecutive days (known as a “Benefit Period”), subject to certain 
deductibles and obligations.19  Although there is no limit on the number of 
Benefit Periods to which a Medicare beneficiary is entitled, as a general rule 
there must be sixty consecutive days between any two Benefit Periods, 
where the beneficiary does not receive any inpatient hospital or other 
qualifying care under Medicare. 20  
A. Negation, Disjunction, and Conjunction 
With its nearly fifty-year history, Medicare’s evolution has been 
surprisingly marginal in comparison to other public programs, while still 
serving the health insurance needs for those sixty-five years of age or 
older.21  Perhaps the most significant change occurred in the 1980s under the 	  
 17. See Title 42, Ch. 7 (Social Security), Subchapter XIX (Grants to States for 
Medical Assistance Program). 
 18. Johnson, Remarks at Signing, (Jul. 30, 1965), supra note 16. 
 19. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE GENERAL 
INFORMATION, ELIGIBILITY, AND ENTITLEMENT [hereinafter “CMS MANUAL”], Ch. 3, §§ 
10.4, 10.4.1, 10.4.2, 10.4.3, 10.4.3.1, 10.4.4. (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/ 
ge101c03.pdf.  
 20. Id. at  Ch. 3, § 10.4.2. 
 21. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (expanding Medicare 
eligibility to people under the age of 65 with certain long-term disabilities as well as 
those with kidney disease); Health Maintenance Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 
87 Stat. 914 (1973) (creating a partnership of sorts between the Federal Government and 
certain health care providers as they eased Medicare’s increasing burden); Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd) (requiring hospitals that receive federal funding to treat 
any patient with an emergency condition in such a way that, upon the patient’s release, 	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Reagan administration with the introduction of the PPS and Diagnosis-
Related Groups (“DRGs”). 22   Restructuring the Medicare system by 
reimbursing hospitals “at a fixed amount for each patient discharged 
regardless of the costs incurred by the hospital,”23 DRGs to this day remain 
at the center of the Medicare system.24 
The changes recently introduced by PPACA reach Medicare’s core, 
although implementation has just begun and will continue for decades to 
come.25  PPS introduced the notion of efficiency to the Medicare system, 
and with PPACA comes the era of performance.26   With thirty years 
separating the PPS and PPACA, each reform raised the threat of catastrophic 
operating losses for hospitals unable to meet the demands to change.  DRGs 
have been generally successful in keeping hospitals within any fiscal 
objectives, and, as an added benefit, DRGs have also shown their influence 
in creating a hospital dynamic that forces physicians to align with these new 
hospital efficiencies, lest the hospital be put in the position of having to 
exclude physician participation whenever possible.27 
Over time, however, DRGs have evolved to such an extent that their 
current level of complexity may be seen as counterintuitive to their original 	  
“no further deterioration of the condition is likely”); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (creating a 
national standard for electronic health care transactions and national identifiers for health 
insurance plans, providers and employees); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (establishing the “Medicare Advantage” option for 
beneficiaries sometimes referred to as “Part C” and previously known as “Medicare + 
Choice”); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (creating “Part D” and also establishing in part a network 
of Recovery Audit Contractors (“RACs”) to detect and correct improper payments within 
Medicare); Deficit Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2005) (expanding 
the RAC program to the state level through a Medicaid Integrity Program); Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH”), Pub. L. No. 
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (protecting patient confidentiality by expanding provider 
liability under HIPAA). 
 22. Mark B. McClellan, Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth, in 
ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 149  (David A. Wise ed. 1996); GAIL R. 
WILENSKY, THE ECONOMICS OF DRG-BASED PHYSICIAN REIMBURSEMENT (Cent. for 
Health Affairs 1985). 
 23. Alvarado Cmty. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119. 
 24. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems 
for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System 
and Fiscal Year 2014 Rates, 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496 (Aug. 19, 2013). 
 25. See, e.g., id. 
 26. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 412.160. 
 27. See generally David M. Frankford, The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency and 
Organizational Rationality, 10 YALE L. J. ON REG. 273 (1993). 
284 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:2 
intent.  By 2008, DRGs splintered into Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related 
Groups (“MS-DRGs”), which focus on patients with similar clinical 
conditions and correlating fixed reimbursements.28  Moreover, certain MS-
DRGs are linked to complications or comorbidities (“CCs”) as well as major 
complications or comorbidities (“MCCs”), thereby transforming the 
relatively simple 1982 system of 467 DRGs into a modern day labyrinth that 
not only includes additional acronymic descriptors introduced in 2008,29 
such as the applicable DRG “w/CC,” “w/o CC,” “w/MCC,” and “w/o 
MCC,” but also a set of 2014 regulations that further define 1,622 MCCs 
and 3,529 CCs.30  As each variation alters the expected reimbursement, 
nearly any error in a patient’s hospital bill may result in a false claim, which 
constitutes a criminal offense under federal law.31  At its core, the Federal 	  
 28. 42 C.F.R. § 412.4. 
 29. Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 
2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130 (Aug. 22, 2007); but see Proposed Changes to the 
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and Fiscal 
Year 2010 Rates and to the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and 
Rate Year 2010 Rates, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,080, 24,092 (May 22, 2009) (“We believe that 
revisions to the DRG system to better recognize severity of illness and changes to the 
relative weights based on costs rather than charges are improving the accuracy of 
payment rates in the IPPS.”). 
 30. 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496 (Aug. 19, 2013). The proposed regulations for 2015 contain 
similar DRG numbers.   79 Fed. Reg. 27,978 (May 15, 2014). 
 31. See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care 
Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 247 (2004) (“The abstract contours of fraud 
and abuse principles must be translated into practical requirements to which health care 
providers can adhere—and against which their compliance can be measured.”).  The 
primary body of law under which liability may arise in health care transactions is the 
Federal False Claims Act (“FCA”). 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) states: 
 (1) [A]ny person who— (A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (B) knowingly makes, 
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a 
false or fraudulent claim; (C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph 
(A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G); (D) has possession, custody, or control of 
property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly 
delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property; (E) 
is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property 
used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the 
Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that 
the information on the receipt is true; (F) knowingly buys, or receives as a 
pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee 
of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not 
sell or pledge property; or (G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made 
or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly 
and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or 	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False Claims Act (“FCA”) imposes liability on anyone who “knowingly 
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment 
or approval.”32 
B. Codifying the Confusion 
In its attempt to provide a more solid groundwork for American 
healthcare, PPACA did what may have been previously considered 
impossible by making Medicare reimbursements even more complicated, 
escalating the process to a level where the system of guaranteed health 
insurance can only be explained through algorithms. 33   Each year the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) publishes updated 	  
property to the Government, is liable to the United States Government for a 
civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 . . .  plus 3 
times the amount of damages. 
 32. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). Over the years Congress passed many laws 
focusing on fraud and abuse, including: Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (regulating Medicare provider fraud and abuse, as well 
as over utilization and unnecessary referrals); Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse 
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977) (expanding the scope of 
prohibited conduct under Medicare to include practically any remuneration for a 
physician from the referral of a Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary); Civil Monetary 
Penalties Law of 1981, Pub. L. No.  97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (authorizing the federal 
government to assess fines as well as enforce program exclusions against providers who 
submit false, fraudulent or otherwise inappropriate claims to Medicare or Medicaid); 
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, 
101 Stat. 680 (1987) (enlisting the aid of the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) to 
regulate inappropriate provider arrangements); Ethics in Patient Referral Act of 1989, 
Pub L. No. 101-239, 102 Stat. 2106 (commonly known as the first of three “Stark” laws, 
Congress passed regulations directed at physician referrals for clinical services to an 
entity in which the physician has a financial interest); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (Stark II) and the 2007 
modifications to Stark II (informally known as Stark III); Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (expanding the reverse 
false claim provision significantly so that it now prohibits “knowingly conceal[ing] or 
knowingly and improperly avoid[ing] or decreas[ing] an obligation to pay” the United 
States; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G); Section 6402 PPACA (establishing a new 
requirement for “Reporting and Returning of Overpayments” within 60 days of 
identifying the overpayment). Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and 
Abuse; Revisions to the Office of Inspector General's Civil Monetary Penalty Rules, 79 
Fed. Reg. 27,080 (May 12, 2014) (clarifying the OIG’s civil money penalty authority 
from the PPACA). 
 33. See Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp. v. Sebelius, 718 F.3d 914, 916 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (noting that the statutory language for calculating a hospital’s Medicare 
disproportionate patient percentage (“DPP”) “is downright byzantine and its meaning not 
easily discernible”). 
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regulations for the Medicare Program, and in particular the Inpatient 
Prospective Payment Systems (“IPPS”) for Acute Care Hospitals. Effective 
October 1 of each year (the start of the Federal Government’s fiscal year), 
the IPPS regulations set forth in copious detail what hospitals can expect 
from the Medicare Program in the forthcoming fiscal year.  With the 2014 
final rules weighing in at 546 triple-columned pages from the Federal 
Register,34 these annual updates average about half the size of PPACA itself, 
and address nearly everything a hospital needs to know about changes to the 
Medicare program for the following year. 35 
Some of the more intricate topics include the MS-DRG adjustments,36 the 
Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program (“VBP”) (for fiscal years 2014 
through 2019), 37  Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (“RRP”), 38 
Hospital-Acquired Conditions (“HAC”) and Healthcare-Associated 
Infections (“HAI”), 39  as well as a total reconfiguration of Medicare 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (“DSH”) payments.40  These regulations 
continue to cause “dread” for any Medicare enthusiast, “for not only are they 
dense reading of the most tortuous kind, but Congress also revisits the area 
frequently, generously cutting and pruning in the process and making any 
solid grasp of the matters addressed merely a passing phase.”41  Indeed, poor 	  
 34. 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496 (Aug. 19, 2013).  The proposed rules for 2015 are a mere 
408 triple-columned pages in comparison.  Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment 
Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective 
Payment System and Proposed Fiscal Year 2015 Rates, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,979 (May 15, 
2014). 
 35. CMS’s objective is to “transform Medicare from a passive payer of claims to an 
active purchaser of quality [health care] for its beneficiaries.”  Hospital Inpatient Value-
Based Purchasing Program, 76 Fed. Reg.  2,454-2,455 (Jan. 13, 2011). 
 36. 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,506. 
 37. Id. at 50,677. 
 38. Id. at 50,653. 
 39. Id. at 50,523. 
 40. Id. at 50,613; see also Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp., 718 F.3d at 916. 
 41. Rehabilitation Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1449 (4th Cir. 1994). 
An advanced degree in mathematics may also be useful in understanding Medicare. See, 
e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,602. 
In the FY 2010-based IPPS market basket, NAICS 55 expenses that were 
subject to allocation based on the home office allocation methodology 
represent 5.650 percent of the total operating costs.  Based on the home office 
results, we are apportioning 3.503 percentage points of the 5.650 percentage 
points figure into the labor-related share and designating the remaining 2.147 
percentage points as non labor-related.  In sum, based on the two allocations 
mentioned above, we apportioned 4.804 percentage points into the labor-
related share.  This amount is added to the 0.696 percentage point of 	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performance in 2014’s more complex topics could potentially force a 
hospital out of business.42 
C. The Hospital VBP 
Well into its second year, the Hospital VBP Program is nothing short of 
an epic restructuring of the Medicare Program, as it places performance 
rather than costs at center stage for determining hospital reimbursements.43  
On October 1, 2012, its first day in operation, the Hospital VBP Program 
reduced hospital reimbursements by one percent across the board, thereby 
creating a “bonus pool” for those successful in this new program, based 
upon each individual hospital’s Total Performance Score (“TPS”).44  This 
initial reduction increases each year, and is presently capped at two percent 
for 2017.45 
Calculation of a hospital’s TPS includes determining performance in 
addressing specific clinical conditions or procedures46 (seventy percent of 
the TPS) and patient satisfaction (thirty percent of the TPS).47  CMS then 
“converted each hospital’s TPS into a value-based incentive payment 	  
professional fees that we already identified as labor-related, resulting in a 
professional fees:  Labor-related cost weight of 5.500 percent. 
 42. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(7)(c)(5)(2013) (Hospital Value Based 
Purchasing Program, wherein reductions to the base operating DRG for hospitals 
increases to two percent in 2017); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(C)(iii) (2013) (Hospital 
Readmission Reduction Program, wherein reductions to the base operating DRG for 
hospitals can increase to as much as three percent in 2015); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(p)(1) 
(2013) (Hospital-Acquired Conditions, which can decrease hospital Medicare revenue by 
one percent starting in 2015); Lisa Rosenbaum, The Whole Ball Game–Overcoming the 
Blind Spots in Health Care Reform, 368 N. ENGL. J. MED. 959 (2013) (“If we focus on 
physicians and patients separately, we lose any sense of how their goals match up and 
whether patients value care that the evidence indicates is necessary.”); Karen Kane, What 
Does Quality Cost?  Analyzing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Value 
Based Purchasing Provision and How It Could Affect the Delivery of Care by Hospitals, 
14 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 69, 78-80 (2011); Michelle Nicole Diamond, Legal Triage for 
Healthcare Reform, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 255, 272 (2011). 
 43. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,677 (May 10, 2013). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(7)(C) (2012). 
 45. Id. 
    46.    See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(2)(B)(i)(I) and (for fiscal year 2013)  and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ww(o)(2)(B)(ii)(for fiscal year 2014).  These quality measures include (1) Acute 
Myocardial Infarction (two measures); (2) Heart Failure (one measure); (3) Pneumonia 
(two measures); (4) Healthcare-Associated Infections through the surgical care 
improvement project (seven measures) which focuses on reducing surgical 
complications; and (5) in 2015, efficiency measures “include measures of Medicare 
spending per beneficiary.” Id. 
   47.  See 78 Fed. Reg. 50,677 (May 10, 2013). 
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percentage using a linear exchange function [1.836305411648] and then 
converted the value-based incentive payment percentage into a per discharge 
value-based incentive payment amount.” 49   For 2013 and 2014, CMS 
regulations for the Hospital VBP Program include twelve clinical processes 
of care measures, eight patient experience of care dimensions (identified 
from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and 
Systems (“HCAHPS”) survey), and three outcome measures.50  In Fiscal 
Year 2015, Medicare regulations will add two new outcome measures and 
an efficiency measure that tracks Medicare spending per beneficiary.51 
Familiarizing oneself with these new measures and their descriptions, 
however, is only the beginning.  To fully understand how the Hospital VBP 
Program will impact a hospital’s reimbursement in 2016, it is imperative to 
pay careful attention to the achievement threshold and benchmark figures, 
which do not include the numerical values that result when the performance 
standards are calculated.  The 2016 finalized performance standards for 
outcome domain measures, with achievement thresholds and benchmarks, 
include: 
 
Measure ID       Measure Description        Achm’t 52   Benchmark53 
          (Percentages) 
 
MORT-30-AMI       Acute Myocardial         0.847472     0.862371 
                     Infarction (AMI) 30-day 
                     mortality rate 
 
MORT-30-HF      Heart Failure (HF)        0.881510     0.900315 	  
   48.  See 78 Fed. Reg. 61,197, 61,200 (Oct. 3, 2013) (correcting the original number 
published in the Federal Register on August 19, 2013 (1.8363321306) to read 
“1.8363054116”). 
   49.   See 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496 (Aug. 19, 2013). 
   50.    See id.  To summarize, the 2014 Hospital VBP Program quality measures 
include: (1) Acute Myocardial Infarction (two measures); (2) Heart Failure (one 
measure); (3) Pneumonia (two measures); (4) Healthcare-Associated Infections through 
the surgical care improvement project (seven measures), which focuses on reducing 
surgical complications; and (5) Patient experience of care dimensions.  Id. 
 51. See id. In 2016, Medicare will again add new measures to the Hospital VBP 
Program.  Id. 
 52. The achievement threshold means the median (fiftieth percentile) of hospital 
performance on a core measure during a baseline period for a particular fiscal year. 
 53. The benchmark means the arithmetic mean of the top decile of hospital 
performance on a measure during a baseline period for a particular fiscal year.  42 C.F.R. 
§ 412.160. 
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                     30-day mortality rate 
 
MORT-30-PN     Pneumonia (PN) 30-day     0.882651     0.904181 
                    mortality rate 
 
PSI-90      Complication/patient          0.622879          0.451792 
                    safety for selected 
                    indicators (composite) 
 
The finalized clinical process of care, outcome and efficiency domain 
measures for 2016, for example, include: 
 
Measure ID   Measure Description       Achm’t     Benchmark 
          (Percentages) 
 
IMM-2   Influenza Immunization       0.90607    0.98875 
 
PN-6                 Initial Antibiotic Selection   0.96552   1.00000 
                            For CAP in Immuno- 
                 Competent Patient 
 
SCIP-Inf-2   Prophylactic Antibiotic      0.99074   1.00000 
                 Selection for Surgical 
                 Patients 
 
SCIP-Inf-3  Prophylactic Antibiotics      0.98086   1.00000 
                Discontinued Within 24 
                Hours After Surgery End 
                       Time 
 
SCIP-Inf-9         Urinary Catheter Re-              0.97059   1.00000 
   moved On Postoperative 
   Day 1 or Postoperative 
   Day 2 
 
SCIP-Card-2  Surgery Patients on        0.97727   1.00000 
   Beta- Blocker Therapy 
   Prior to Arrival Who 
   Received a Beta-Blocker 
   During the Perioperative 
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   Period 
 
SCIP-VTE-2  Surgery Patients Who       0.98225  1.00000 
   Received Appropriate 
   Venous Thromboembolism 
   Prophylaxes Within 24 
   Hours Prior to Surgery to 
   24 Hours After Surgery 
 
CAUTI   Catheter-Associated       0.801   0.000 
   Urinary Tract Infection 
 
CLABSI  Central Line-Associated       0.465             0.000 
   Blood Stream Infection 
 
SSI    Surgical Site Infection 
   ● Colon         0.668 0.000 
   ● Abdominal        0.752 0.000 
   Hysterectomy   
 
HCAHPS Survey Dimension  Floor   Achm’t      Benchmark 
                        (Percentages) 
      
Communication with Nurses   53.99    77.67          86.07 
 
Communication with Doctors   57.01    80.40         88.56 
 
Responsiveness of Hospital 
Staff       38.21    64.71          79.76 
 
Pain Management    48.96   70.18         78.16 
 
Communication About Medicines  34.61    62.33          72.77 
 
Hospital Cleanliness & Quietness  43.08    64.95         79.10 
 
Discharge Information    61.36   84.70         90.39 
 
Overall Rating of Hospital   34.95   69.32         83.97 
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Although the 2014 Regulations provide examples that extend through 
2019, the information set forth above is consistent with the CMS approach 
that “is well understood by patient advocates, hospitals, and other 
stakeholders because it was developed during a lengthy process that 
involved extensive stakeholder input, and was based on a scoring 
methodology [CMS] presented in a report to Congress.”54 
D. Hospital RRP 
The Hospital RRP penalizes hospitals for certain excess readmissions, 
including acute myocardial infarction, heart failure and pneumonia. 55  
Starting in October 2014, while Medicare will exclude planned 
readmissions, the total amount for which a hospital may be penalized 
increases to two percent (up from one percent in 2013).56  Moreover, in 2015 
Medicare will introduce four new measures for inclusion in the Hospital 
RRP: (1) coronary artery bypass grafts (“CABG”) surgery; (2) chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”); (3) percutaneous coronary 
intervention (“PCI”); and (4) other vascular conditions.57 
For 2014, the formula employed by CMS to calculate the readmissions 
penalty, or readmission adjustment factor, is: 
Aggregate payments for excess readmissions = [sum of base 
operating DRG payments for AMI x (Excess Readmission Ratio 
for AMI-1)] + [sum of base operating DRG payments for HF x 
(Excess Readmission Ratio for HF-1)] + [sum of base operating 
DRG payments for PN x (Excess Readmission Ratio for PN-1)] + 
[sum of base operating DRG payments for COPD x (excess 
readmission ratio for COPD-1)] + [sum of base operating 
payments for THA/TKA x (excess readmission ratio for 
THA/TKA -1)]. 
Aggregate payments for all discharges = sum of base operating 
DRG payments for all discharges.  
Ratio = 1 – (Aggregate payments for excess 
readmissions/Aggregate payments for all discharges.)58 	  
 54. Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and 
the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Proposed Fiscal Year 
2014 Rates, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,616-17 (May 10, 2013) (Interim Rule). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q) (2012). 
 56. Id. at  § 1395ww(q)(3)(C). 
 57. 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,653. The regulations for 2015 may also include Total Hip 
Arthroplasty (“THA”) and Total Knee Arthroplasty  (“TKA”). 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,988. 
 58. Id.  See also Readmissions Reduction Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-	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The Readmission Adjustment Factor for 2014 is the higher of the ratio or 
0.9800, all of which is based on claims data from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 
2012. 59   In response to the RRP, hospitals have focused considerable 
attention toward discharge and post-discharge care, in some instances 
informally extending a hospital stay beyond its clinical conclusion,60 or at 
other times not admitting a return patient for “inpatient” status but rather 
keeping the patient in “observation.”61  Because the program targets elderly 
hospital patients, the debate over the RRP’s value continues.62 
E. Medicare DSH 
Starting in Fiscal Year 2014, hospitals that usually receive Medicare DSH 
payments will receive these monies in two separate payments: (1) Twenty-
five percent of the amount the hospital previously received under Medicare 
DSH, and (2) “an additional payment for the DSH hospital’s proportion of 
uncompensated care, determined as the product of three factors.”63  These 
three factors, which now make up seventy-five percent of the Medicare DSH 
funds to which a hospital may be entitled, include: 
(1) 75% payment of the payments that would otherwise be made 
[under the old DSH methodology] (2) 1 minus the percentage 
change in the percent of individuals under the age of 65 who are 
uninsured (minus 0.1 percentage points for FY 2014, and minus 
0.2 percentage points for FY 2015 through FY 2017); and (3) a 
hospital’s uncompensated care amount relative to the 
uncompensated care amounts of all DSH hospitals expressed as a 
percentage.64 
II. MAKING SENSE OF THE FUTURE 
The projected efficiency with which Medicare will operate under the 2014 
regulations serves as a basis to justify the nature and complexity of 
PPACA’s newfound annual regulations.  Even those programs designed to 
reallocate Medicare funding to hospitals operating at higher levels of 	  
Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Readmissions-Reduction-Program.html (last visited July 9, 
2014). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q). 
    60.    See 42 C.F.R. § 419.22(n) (defines services that support an inpatient admission 
and Part A as appropriate, notwithstanding the length of stay). 
    61.     See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., HOSPITALS’ USE OF OBSERVATION STAYS 
AND SHORT INPATIENT STAYS FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (July 29, 2013). 
 62. See generally Press, supra note 10. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r). 
 64. 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,613. 
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efficiency are estimated to reduce initial payments by as much as $1.1 
billion.65  The early stages alone of this current reconfiguration are expected 
to force a reduction of more than five percent for any particular hospital.66  If 
such cutbacks are applied across the healthcare spectrum, the anticipated 
reductions alone would result in a $30 billion cut.  With hospital profit 
margins facing a national crisis, it remains to be seen if hospitals can afford 
this loss of revenue.67 
If successful, this redistribution of Medicare funding among hospitals is 
only the beginning of what may soon become a total reconfiguration of the 
Medicare program.  From its humble origins in 1965, when it cost 
beneficiaries $3.00 per year for coverage under Part B,68 Medicare has 
grown to become anything but modest when viewed in terms of its ever-
evolving infrastructure, and it is far too early to predict the fate of programs 
such as Hospital VBP or the RRP.  Nevertheless, from its inception PPACA 
has been structured to strive toward long-term goals,69 and while the Federal 
Government believes that the effects of recent changes such as those 
addressing the Hospital VBP Program will directly impact the improvement 
of patient outcomes, safety, and the patient’s overall experience.70  This 
same government, however, acknowledges that there is no concrete way to 
“estimate these benefits in actual dollar and patient terms”71 because the 
programs do not begin until the following fiscal year.  Only time will tell if 
modern healthcare’s recently added complexities will fortify America’s 
healthcare structure or create a series of financial cracks to weaken the 
foundations upon which it was built. 
 	  
 65. Id. at 50,507. 
 66. Id.  This, of course, does not take into consideration reductions in revenue from 
sequestration (2%), see 2 U.S.C. § 900(c)(2), as well as inpatient quality reporting (2%), 
see 42 C.F.R. § 412.140, and outpatient quality reporting (2%), see 42 C.F.R. § 419.46.  
Together these three additional items can raise reductions from five percent to eleven 
percent. 
 67. See generally Mark G. Harrison & Cecilia C. Montalvo, The Financial Health of 
California Hospitals: A Looming Crisis, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 120 (Jan. 2002); Declining 
Operating Margins Show U.S. Hospitals Still Face Challenges, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 
(Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/health-care-social- 
\assistance/864684-1.html. 
   68.  See Marian E. Gornick, et al., Thirty Years of Medicare: Impact on the Covered 
Population, 18:2 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 183 (1996). 
   69.  See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2642 (2012) (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting). 
   70.    See 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,677. 
   71.   78 Fed. Reg. 27,882 (May 10, 2013). 
